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ABSTRACT 
Cheap electricity has long been the basis for locating aluminum 
smelters. However, a limited number of sources of cheap electric power 
are available around the world. Such sources consist of the best 
hydroelectric sites and possibly sites near gas field and low grade lignite 
and subbituminous coal deposits--unfavorably located to compete on 
world markets. A few additional aluminum smelters might be located a t  
the remaining sites of this low cost power. However, critical limits exist 
to extensive relocation of industry near cheap energy or even the per- 
sistence of cheap electricity. Electricity is difficult but not impossible to 
transmit over long distances and a time may come, where it becomes 
profitable to integrate the low cost facility into a national or international 
generating system (grid). Moreover, given the limited number of avail- 
able sites, only a limited number of plants seeking low cost energy can be 
accommodated. Moreover, cheap energy is not the only consideration in 
plant location and high nonenergy costs may eat up any energy cost sav- 
ings. The long run prospect is that the margin aluminum smelting will be 
based on nuclear generated electricity. However, there may well remain 
unexploited low cost sources and excess capacity so that it will pay to 
locate several more smelters near cheap energy. 

EWXXWCITY FOR ALUMINUM IN THE ERA OF EXPENSTYE ENERGY 
THE ECONOMIC PRINCIPLES 
Richard L. Gordon 
Electric power long has been an important input into aluminum 
smelting. The importance, in fact, has been sufficiently great that 
smelters often have been located at  sites near a cheap source of energy 
that may have been remote from raw materials, markets, or both. 
Changing energy market conditions in the 1970s have drastically altered 
the economics of aluminum smelting. Many producers, particularly those 
located where electricity costs were high, have endured severe cost pres- 
sures. Some areas, notably the U.S.  Pacific Northwest, have exhausted 
surpluses of low-cost sources of energy for electricity generation. 
Attention, understandably, has turned towards determining what 
adjustments, if any, in the location and other characteristics of aluminum 
production might be made to alleviate the cost difficulties. 
This paper seeks to appraise the basic conceptual issues associated 
with the electricity problems of the aluminum industry. While the discus- 
sion draws upon knowledge of the actual characteristics of electric power 
supply around the world, the stress is on providmg an analytic frame- 
work. The primary concern is in explaining the determination of the 
social marginal cost of electricity in different regions. 
The discussion begins with an analysis that lgnores the problem of 
load variation--the temporal fluctuations of electricity demand. Then, the 
concept of load variation and its implications are examined. Finally, note 
is taken of how governments around the world have imposed policies to 
hold the price of electricity to many consumers, including aluminum 
smelters, below its social cost. 
The most critical point about electricity market conditions follows 
directly from basic economic principles, that should be, but probably are 
not, recognized in all appraisals of aluminum. In any region, cheap 
sources of energy for generating electricity are in limited supply. Thus, 
sufficient demand growth will exhaust these supplies. Any search for 
cheap energy, therefore, must include evaluation of demand growth pros- 
pects. 
Another critical consideration is whether the areas of cheap energy 
have h g h  costs of other key inputs that offset the advantage of low-cost 
electricity. A final question is the economics of electric power in those 
countries dependent on coal or nuclear power for increased electricity 
output. It is argued that the prevailing economics can keep the costs well 
below those of oil-generated electricity. 
The discussion begins with a review of the concept of social cost. 
Then, the economic principles relevant to analysis of electricity availabil- 
ity are noted and employed to develop the basic arguments about cheap 
electricity. Then, the other issues are examined. 
The Concept of Social Cost 
Economic theory stresses that social efficiency is attained when the 
social marginal cost associated with the level of activity maintained 
equals the price being paid for that output. The theory proceeds to dis- 
cuss the problems of attaining such an equality. The usual concerns are 
that monopoly will cause prices to exceed marginal costs or that public 
policy will fail to make firms liable for the environmental damage that 
they cause. As suggested above and reviewed more fully below, the prob- 
lem in electric power is quite different from the usual concerns of theor- 
ists (but far from a n  unusual practical problem). Electricity has become 
one of the many goods that politicians have decided should be sold at  
prices below the marginal cost of current output. 
These rules for attaining efficiency are such basic elements of 
economic theory that their comprehensive review is not appropriate 
here. It is presumed readers either are familiar with the concepts or will 
seek explanations from the many available discussions. 
However, a few points should be recalled. Noneconomists need to be 
told that the marginal cost is a measure of the  sacrifice of resources 
needed to produce a change in the output of something. Even economists 
may have to be reminded that this cost varies with the level of output and 
that this variation is a critical concern. 
Moreover, although electric power historically has been considered a 
natural monopoly--an industry in whch marginal costs fall with output, 
the modern realities of at  least generation economics are quite dfferent. 
I t  is clearly an increasing cost industry. 
In fact, it is the eventual run-up of marginal costs as electricity out- 
put expands in any region that is the core of my arguments about the 
cheap-power issue. In particular, it is this increase that eliminates the 
advantage of regions with some supplies of cheap power. The usual 
further consequence is another development familiar to the analysts of 
the economics of political intervention. Increasing cost industries gen- 
erate economic rents--the differences between the price that equals the 
marginal and average costs of the hghest  cost entity operating and the 
lower average costs of the superior resources. Politicians inevitably view 
such rents as fair game for reallocation--unfortunately not necessarily to 
those who would readily be considered particularly needy or deserving. 
In any case, the rakon d'e tre  of economic transactions is to effect 
production and trade that produce benefits in excess of the cost 
incurred. Where an  increase in producing and selling something produces 
a marginal benefit in excess of its marginal cost, the increase should be 
made. This is a self-limiting process because marginal benefits tend to 
decline as availability increases. (The more we have to begin with, the 
less valuable are additional amounts of a given commodity). The end 
point of expansion occurs, then benefits decline to meet costs. Any 
further expansion would cost more than it is worth and would not be 
made. 
Thus, economic theory argues that the output of all commodities 
should be set the level a t  which the (social) marginal cost of production 
equals the amount consumers are willing to pay for that quantity of that 
commodity. So long as the problems of decreasing costs and public-good 
externalities do not arise, it is possible for firms in competitive industries 
to satisfy these rules. 
The Principles Applied-the Search for Cheap Electricity. 
Discussion of aluminum smelting (and other industrial processes in 
which energy is a major cost element) often includes inquiry about the 
availability of low-cost energy in special locations. The marginal-cost 
principle implies that the relevant costs are those of the highest-cost 
energy sources needed to  satisfy demands. Many regions have some low- 
cost energy resources such as the cheapest-to-exploit available 
hydroelectric power and natural gas in areas in which markets are lim- 
ited. 
Historically, significant amounts of aluminum smelting capacity were 
located in areas such as remote parts of Canada and the formerly hydro- 
power surfeited Pacific Northwest of the United States. However, t h s  
situation eventually will cease because no region has unlimited amounts 
of energy available at  the marginal cost that happens to prevail a t  any 
moment. 
Therefore, demand growth, if i t  occurs, eventually absorbs the supply 
of cheaper power and forces resort to higher-cost alternatives. Histori- 
cally, the critical influence for sites adopted for aluminum smelting has 
been the availability of low-cost water power sufficient to supply all the 
electricity needs then existing. Such sources, however, are classic exam- 
ples of the concept of the scarcity of natural resources associated with 
David Ricardo. Water-power resources are limited in quantity and differ 
radically in quality. Use will proceed from the best water resources to 
successively more costly ones. Long before all these supplies are utilized 
it will become economic to introduce the use of fossil-fuel or nuclear-fired 
plants. 
Fossil-f uel and nuclear generation are also subject to increasing 
costs. It is undesirable for any one unit to comprise a significant enough 
proportion of production capability that its loss causes a high probability 
that demands cannot be met. Thus, the optimum a t  any moment involves 
employing many units. The needs of these units for land possessing 
characteristics such as adequate space and access to cooling water 
essential for a power plant produces increasing costs because the same 
principle of limited quantities and different qualities applies here as well 
as in the water-power case. 
Obviously, the same problem of increasing costs applies to a country 
with only a mineral-fuel-based electricity sector. Moreover, the extensive 
development of electric power based on cheap fossil fuels also ultimately 
will produce cost increase because of the notable effects of the expansion 
on the supplies of cheap fossil fuels. 
All of thls indicates that at any point in time the marginal cost curve 
for electric power is upward sloping. It should further be recalled that it 
is this type of increasing costs that is relevant to the viability of a com- 
petitive industry. The much reviewed question of whether a firm can at 
least break even with prices equal to marginal cost is resolved by viewing 
the shape of the marginal cost curve a t  each point of time. Where the 
marginal cost curve for each product is upward sloping and the firms are 
operating a t  each moment of time in the range of increasing costs, 
Euler's theorem for homogeneous functions, the basic rule by which via- 
bility is evaluated, indicates that sufficient return on investment can be 
earned. (The theorem, as presented in numerous texts, shows that when 
there are diseconomies of scale, total payments to  the factors of produc- 
tion including capital will fall short of revenues and revenues exceed costs 
only if there are economies of scale--represented in the single product 
firm case by decreasing average cost.) The only problem is that the 
industry must be foresighted enough that it restricts capacity to levels 
that produce high enough revenues to permit adequate profits. 
It should be noted further that the industry long had been subject to 
a phenomenon of steadily downward shf ts  over time in the marginal cost 
curve. This was produced by a combination of technical progress and the 
effects of demand growth. 
The historical phenomenon (that unfortunately seems to have ceased 
in the 1970s) of steady cost reduction arose from shifts in the supply 
curve due to technological progress. In addition, demand growth alters 
the optimal plant size. The probability of lost ability to serve customers 
depends upon the proportion of sales represented by an individual unit. 
With larger demands, the same level of relative dependence on any unit 
implies a higher absolute size. Thus, larger units are possible for larger 
systems. These larger units, in turn, have lower production costs than 
smaller ones. 
These considerations interact. One way to increase the size of a sys- 
tem is to connect previously independent utilities. One way this might be 
done is to merge companies. Historically, interconnection began by 
merging small companies that served areas as small as part of a city. 
Throughout the world, eventually a move was made to nationalize electric 
power. This served to provide an integrated national system 
North America is a major exception. Canada has government-owned 
power, but only a t  the provincial level. In the United States, private 
power coexists with power owned by federal, s tate,  and various types of 
local government and with cooperatives. In the 1930s, failures occurred in 
the complex network of holding companies that  arose to amalgamate the 
ownersbp of utilities. This inspired federal legislation placing severe lim- 
its on such amalgamations. As a result, existing companies were radically 
restructured, and mergers were subjected to what proved to be the 
highly unsympathetic scrutiny of the Securities and Exchange Commis- 
sion. However, the  industry was still able to extend interconnection by 
developing a wide range of arrangements for intercompany exchanges of 
power. These exchanges, moreover, involve cooperation between U.S. and 
Canadian utilities. 
However, shifts of this sort still make possible revenues in excess of 
cost a t  each point of time even with prices equal to marginal cost. Thus, 
the shifts do not create the classic natural monopoly problem but instead 
merely lower the amount of return on investment to justify a given level 
of output. 
For these reasons, electric power is in the sense critical for public 
policy an increasing cost industry. Ths  is becoming increasingly recog- 
nized by specialists in the U.S. electric power industry. Some go on to 
argue that the same proposition applies to long-distance transmission of 
electricity. Thus, the deregulation of a t  least generation and perhaps 
transmission has been widely proposed. 
(I have argued elsewhere, Gordon, 1982, that the dangers of only 
deregulating generation and transmission are an undesirable restructur- 
ing of a well-established industry and the prospect that the continued 
regulation of distribution will defeat the goals of deregulation. Power to 
control buying prices will effectively maintain the regulation of genera- 
tion and transmission. I further argue that regulation does so little good 
that  total deregulation may be the preferable option and regulatory 
reform may be preferable to partial deregulation. The skepticism about 
regulating distribution arises from doubts about both whether the local 
monopolies are as potent as supporters of regulation assume and whether 
regulation helps.) 
Ths ,  of course, contrasts with the vision of electric power as a 
decreasing cost industry and renders irrelevant to the case all the policy 
propositions related to  decreasing-cost industries. As discussed further 
below, the real problems are the economic rents associated with owner- 
ship of lower-cost energy resources. I return t o . t h i s  point again, as 
already noted, a t  the end of this paper. The immediate need is to 
reiterate the points made earlier about the consequences of increasing 
costs. 
The specific need is to recall the forces that tend to prevent the con- 
tinuation of low prices. One critical point has already been made. If 
there is steady prolonged growth of demand, eventually resort to higher- 
cost resources will arise. 
Demand growth, in turn, can occur in many ways of which the most 
important to consider is the movement to the areas of industries depen- 
dent on cheaper power. 
Other developments are also possible. As power or the fuel to gen- 
erate it become more expensive, incentives arise to increase trade in 
low-cost energy or power. Alternatively, improvements in energy tran- 
sportation or electricity transmission can stimulate exports. Capacity 
can be built more rapidly than is profitable. This situation has arisen in 
the electric power industry in some parts of the United States, France, 
Brazil, Canada and perhaps other countries in whch plans for expansion 
were made before rising energy costs drastically slowed industry growth. 
Aluminum producers can perhaps get bargain power from these overbuilt 
systems. However, this situation cannot persist because demand growth 
and capacity retirement will eliminate the excess capacity. All this, of 
course, is warning that what happened in the Pacific Northwest United 
States eventually will occur elsewhere. 
To be sure, the length of that time period is a critical concern. If 
low-cost persists long enough, i t  can be profitable to locate a plant in an 
area of low-cost power. In the very long run, differential power costs may 
be irrelevant to the location of aluminum smelters. However, this may be 
a very prolonged long-run. In fact, the periods involved may be of suffi- 
cient duration that relocation of smelters to take advantage of the 
interim situation may be profitable. In certain countries marginal costs 
may long remain well below the cost of nuclear-generated electricity. 
Location of a smelter in such countries could be profitable. The present 
value of the cost saving during the transition period may, given large 
enough cost reduction over a long enough period, suffice to repay the 
investment in a new smelter. 
Two or three subcases can be distinguished. First, a country may 
possess large supplies of low-cost difficult-to-transport energy as water 
power or natural gas in locations far from industrial centers. There sim- 
ply may not be enough demand from either. local industry or foreign com- 
panies locating to take advantage of the cheap energy to absorb the 
entire supply of low cost energy until many years have passed. 
Second, the mass of energy shocks of the 1970s has caused capacity 
in many countries to have been built far in advance of demand growth. As 
I argue in the next section, the rise of oil prices appears to be the least  
important of the many cost-raising pressures. For reasons that are not 
well understood, real construction costs for electric power facilities of a 
given design have risen sharply during the 1970s. Moreover, increasing 
concern with nuclear safety, the pressure to reduce emissions of pollu- 
tants from fossil-fuel burning, and the desire to reduce the discharge into 
natural waterways of waste heat from power plants has made it necessary 
to build more elaborate, more expensive to operate plants. Generally, 
pressures of these sorts rather than the rising price of oil have been (with 
exceptions noted later in this section) been the main source of rising 
electricity costs. 
A graphic illustration of all t h s  is provided by the United States. A 
surge of power cost increases did coincide with the 1973-1974 oil price 
shock. Some analysts claim that actually quite different considerations 
such as weather conditions conducive to abnormally high electricity use, 
tightening environmental regulations on coal burning, the passage of a 
stringent federal law regulating mining practices affecting workers health 
and safety, labor unrest in mining, and delays in completion of nuclear 
plants were the true problems. For example, in some fashion that no one 
has managed satisfactorily to untangle, the health and safety laws and 
the labor unrest caused U.S. coal mines output per man day to decline 
sharply throughout of the 1970s. However, coal prices were unaffected 
by the second oil shock. What did happen was that the movement towards 
increased oil use (which never exceeded 18 percent of generation) in 
electricity generation reversed sharply. (Oil generation declined almost 
60 percent from 1978 to 1982). 
In any case, whatever the causes, the effect was a sharp reduction in 
growth of electric-energy consumption. Facilities have long leadtimes and 
plants became available that had been designed to meet the much higher 
demand when construction began. Ths has produced a second source of 
low cost power--the non utilized capacity built in anticipation of demand 
growth that did not occur. Moreover, cases may arise in which the avail- 
able capacity and the growth prospects are such that in some locations 
such as Quebec, cheap power again may be available for a sufficiently 
long period that it pays to locate an aluminum smelter. 
A possible third case is that in which a country has been overly influ- 
enced by the portions of the economic development literature that stress 
that creation of lnfrastructure--transportation, power, communications, 
and similar basic facilities--is the key to promoting growth. Hydroelectric 
dams built under the guidance of this theory may have such limited 
demand prospects that again it may pay to locate a smelter near them. 
A converse of the argument is that those countries, notably Japan, 
with heavily oil-based electric power were most severely hurt by the oil 
shocks. Their problem is ultimately to replace oil-fired capacity with 
lower cost plants. Ths too can be time consuming and it may pay, as the 
Japanese have chosen to do, to shift much smelting away from Japan. 
The ultimate concern is the extent to which process of relocation is 
selfdefeating. The capacity of attractive areas must be large enough to 
absorb the entry of aluminum smelters and similar activities without 
eliminating the unused supply of low-cost resources. 
In sum, one must carefully steer between the Charybdis of belief in 
perpetually cheap energy and the Scylla of neglecting extended oppor- 
tunities to take advantage of excess in supply of sufficient endurance to 
justify investment. My concerns tend to stress the capacity depletion 
problem. Many overly enthuiastic sales people are trying to convince 
energy users of the virtues of cheap power. Few people are discussing the 
underlying economic and the limits to perpetually cheap power. Good 
deals probably do exist but care must be taken not to underestimate the 
dangers that, as occurred in the U.S. Pacific Northeast, the low prices will 
vanish sooner than expected. As discussed below, smelters, as any 
activity, can be chosen as the beneficiary of subsidy and opportunities of 
this sort also must be considered. 
Still another concern is whether the areas of cheap energy are truly 
attractive to industries to which energy costs are an important con- 
sideration. Other characteristics of the area such as political instability, 
poor location, or lack of critical human and natural resources may 
outweigh the energy advantages. Development of energy-using industries 
in the Middle East as of 1983 has been negligible. Extravagant plans seem 
never to be realized. 
The Limits to Electricity Rates-the Constant-Load Case 
Another point to keep in mind is what actually sets the limits to elec- 
tricity prices. In particular, it appears that for reasons that we must 
examine, the limit for most countries is well below the cost of oil- 
generated electricity. The economics of interfuel competition appears to 
be such that everywhere rival fuels will undersell oil in electricity genera- 
tion. 
The critical point here is one made earlier that what matters is not 
just the equality of costs at  the margin, but also the quantities at  which 
the equality occurs. In inter-fuel competition, the rivalry of alternatives 
involves both spatial and end-use differences. The spatial aspects have 
been much more thoroughly analyzed than the end-use questions. Exami- 
nation of the geographic pattern of oil prices long has been a standard 
element of economic literature on world oil (see e.g., Leeman or Adel- 
man). 
The standard exposition indicates that somehow prevailing f.0.b. 
prices are established in every supply area. Delivered prices then are the 
sum of the f.0.b. price and transportation costs. Markets are divided 
among suppliers by the basic economic principle that everyone pays the 
lowest available price. In the world oil case in whch the concern is with 
ocean shpments, i t  can be validly assumed that transportation costs 
depend only on distance. Delivered prices are a steadily increasing func- 
tion of distance. Given two supply areas, the delivered price from each 
then rises steadily as the distance from the supply area increases. At 
some location, termed in literature as the watershed, the delivered prices 
from the two areas will be equal. The world is then split into two regions. 
In each, all consumers between the watershed and a given supplier get 
their oil from that supplier. The market a t  the watershed is split between 
the two suppliers. 
This analysis neglects many critical issues. First, distance is not 
always the sole cause of transportation-cost differences. The volume and 
mode of shipment are also major considerations. Where water transpor- 
tation capacity suffices to handle all the traffic, costs are much lower 
than when the marginal supplies are delivered by rail or truck. For 
example, because of the elaborate inland waterway system in the United 
States and particularly the Mississippi River and its tributaries, distant 
locations such as Tampa, Florida can be served more cheaply by water 
transport from Illinois than some nearer but landlocked locations. 
Another important consideration is that full-train or full-ship con- 
signments are cheaper to handle and thus produce lower rates than 
smaller shipments. Moreover, at  least up to the limits of port capacity, 
larger shps  involve lower unit costs than smaller ones. 
Even more critical a consideration is how the f.0.b. prices are deter- 
mined in the first place. As I have shown elsewhere (Gordon, 1981), the 
processes are generalizations of the standard economic analyses of price 
determination. For example, in a competitive model, a generalization 
concept of market clearing prevails. Each supply area's industry pro- 
duces the quantity whose marginal cost equals the f.0.b. price that custo- 
mers are willing to pay for that quantity. These customers consist of all 
buyers nearer (economically) than the watershed plus a share of the 
watershed market. Additionally, in all demand regions, purchases are 
made from the supply region(s) with the lowest delivered prices, and the 
purchases equal the quantity demanded at  the delivered price. In short, 
all markets clear simultaneously. 
The final consideration is that, as already noted, end uses differ in 
their ability to use various fuels. One source of differences already has 
been noted--larger-scale users can take advantage of economies of scale 
in transportation. As it happens, all aspects of securing heat for indus- 
trial processes involve economies of scale. The boiler, the fuel-storage, 
fuel-handling, and often the heat-utilizing facilities benefit from 
economies of scale. 
More critically, these differences tend to alter the interfuel choices 
quite considerably. Roughly, as energy users move from gas to oil to coal 
to nuclear they encounter steadily higher capital and non-fuel operating 
costs. However, the nature of the economies of scale is such that these 
cost disadvantages narrow as the scale of use increases. Thus, as scale 
increases, less of a fuel-cost saving is needed to offset disadvantages in 
other costs. The largest-scale fuel users by far are electric utilities, and 
they tend to find that their marginal source of fuel is coal or nuclear 
energy. 
At least through 1983, it has, in fact, proved more profitable to 
extend coal and nuclear use to electric utilities in more regions than to 
use coal in more end uses in the regions previously served. The U.S. 
Energy Information Administration and the International Energy Agency 
perennially predict resurgences of coal use in manufactur~ng industries. 
To date little has happened. 
The failure of coal consumption to grow as predicted is often attri- 
buted to business ignorance of the advantages of coal use. An alternative 
explanation, which I prefer, is that the outside observers grossly under- 
state the economic availability of rival fuels and are inadequately aware 
of the economic penalties of using coal in compliance with environmental 
regulations. 
However, this is far less critical than the basic point that some set of 
marginal markets exist in which coal or nuclear power are just barely 
competitive with oil. These markets can be described as involving a dif- 
ferent watershed for different uses. At the very least, many users then 
will secure coal or nuclear energy for less than oil parity. Those with 
better coal or nuclear locational or utilization economics than the margi- 
nal user will have costs below oil parity. 
Discontinuities in the variation of costs among different participants 
in actual fuel markets can cause all actual coal and nuclear users to have 
costs less than oil parity. There may be few or even no consumers who 
actually are in a parity situation. The oil price may simultaneously be too 
high to attract any coal or nuclear users and lower than coal parity for all 
actual oil users. 
Ths  can occur because of substantial jumps in both the scale of 
operation and the ease of transportation. The first point seems the 
simpler to explain. In any given region, an electric power plant may be 
substantially larger than any other fuel-using facility. Thus, the premium 
the nonutility users are willing to pay for oil may be much greater than 
what utilities would pay. The outcome we observe is that the gap between 
coal and oil prices lies in between the criticalpremium levels. 
For example, utilities might switch to coal for a cost saving of $2.00 
per million Btu whle the largest manufacturing plant would require 83.00 
saving. At oil prices of 84.00 and coal prices of 81.50, we have an actual 
difference of $2.50. This is simultaneously more than needed to induce 
utilities to use coal and less than needed to cause manufacturers to use 
coal. There is no actual user for which a $2.50 premium induces coal use. 
Geographic barriers produce similar discontinuities in space. A con- 
siderable price cut, for example, must be made to extend markets from 
coastal to  inland markets not on waterways. To serve inland markets, a 
transfer from ship to inland transportation mode must be made. Thus, 
costs of transfer and the costs of transporting over the additional dis- 
tance by a hgher-cost method causes a blg jump in price to occur as 
markets expand inland from the coast. Again the equilibrium can involve 
a price such that the most attractive fuel on the coast sells for less than 
necessary to undercut the other fuels in that market. Inland, the 
cheapest fuel on the coast may have a delivered price above the amount 
that would make it preferable to the fuel actually selected. 
The practical relevance of all this is that everywhere in the world 
nuclear power in electric utilities seems to cost significantly less than 
oil-generated electricity. At least in the United States, the same is true 
of coal-generated electricity (which probably is why the U.S. tolerates 
the political pressures to burden nuclear power with costs that have 
aborted future U.S. investment in nuclear). Ths, of course, is the basis of 
the prior assertions about long-run power costs. 
The Implications of Load Variation 
The implications of load variation have long fascinated public-utility 
economists. The fascination, in fact, may be excessive to  the extent to 
which it has precluded consideration of the more critical rent allocation 
issues discussed below. The concerns are great enough, nevertheless, to 
merit comment here. 
Load variation refers to the significant temporal swings in electricity 
demand. Variation occurs within the day, the week, and the year in 
response to changes in the pace of electricity-using activities. In the 
United States, originally the dominance of lighting and cooking tended to 
put the annual peak in the winter and the daily peak in the early evening. 
The spread of air conditioning shifted the peak to summer afternoons. 
The rise of electric heat could cause the old pattern to return. 
Given the upward slope of the electric-utility industry cost curve, the 
marginal cost and, therefore, the optimal price of meeting different levels 
of demand differs. The enormous literature on peak-load prices discusses 
the determination of such optimal prices. Much effort has been devoted 
around the world to designing methods for varying prices optimally with 
loads. The principal practical problem is that significant costs are 
incurred in administering a variable-price system. A particular problem 
is that metering the timing as well as the amount of use adds significantly 
to costs. 
(A curious ha tus  in the literature was analysis of the optimum pric- 
ing pattern when price change is costly. However, Gordon, 1982, provides 
such an analysis. The basic results are unsurprising. Price changes 
should occur whenever they produce efficiency gains in production that 
exceed the cost of administering a price change. Between price changes, 
the price should lie in between the range of optimums that would be 
charged in a world of costless price changes. Where in. the range the 
optimum lies depends upon the nature of the demand and supply func- 
tions and the duration of different levels of demand.) 
The analysis of peak load pricing is too complex to be adequately 
treated here (see Gordon 1982 for a fuller view). The analysis can 
equivalently be handled by a socalled two part tariff model in which 
separate demand and capacity charges are considered or by the more 
conventional concept of the price of electric energy at various points of 
time. I prefer the latter. 
Under this analysis, it can be shown that a t  peak, all users should be 
charged a rate equal to the long run marginal cost of supplying peak 
power. Rates should go down. when demand declines but a wide range of 
possible off peak rates could arise. The lower limit is the operating cost 
of the most expensive plant utilized at  that moment. However, as I have 
shown (Gordon 1982), somewhat higher rates may be necessary to repay 
the portion of the capital costs not recovered by the &h rates during 
peak period. 
Given these complexities it is not clear a priori what load variation 
will do overall to the cost of power for aluminum producers. What is 
clear, is that some incentive in the form of hgher charges or supply 
interruption clauses should be provided to encourage aluminum smelters 
to reduce consumption at the peaks. It should be further noted that t h s  
is less problematic than outsiders might think. Substantial peaks are 
rare events. U.S. aluminum smelters, for example, tend to be located 
near winter peaking regions and the problematic surges are the worst 
hours of periodic cold snaps. 
However, the more fundamental question of what happens to the 
overall cost of power to the industry is less clearcut. However, an excel- 
lent prospect does exist that on average, an aluminum industry that is 
part of a grid will pay less than the long-run average cost of coal or 
nuclear power. 
If the aluminum producers tend to respond to the surge of prices 
during peak by substantially curtailing electricity use it will be others 
who pay the peak charges and in the process make substantial contribu- 
tions to recovery of the costs of peak and off peak capacity. To the 
extent that is true the charges to aluminum smelters for off peak power 
would be correspondingly lower. 
Economic Rents in Electric-Power-Economic Tradition Versus Political 
Practice 
Both economists and politicians have great interest in what to do 
with economic rents. It is agreed that the disposition of such rents is a 
value judgement to be decided on the basis of prevailing social e thcs .  
However, political practice in t h s  area runs contrary to a prevailing 
economic consensus on the issue. 
The perils of characterizing the diverse views of economists or any 
other group are considerable. Nevertheless, a considerable amount of 
literature exists arguing in one way or another that the proper use of 
economic rents is to tax them for use to finance the general programs of 
governments. In particular, two alternatives are viewed skeptically. 
First, doubts are raised that any participants--be they consumers or 
producers-in a given market should receive any priority in sharing the 
rents. Second, a particularly disfavored use of rents is subsidy of con- 
surnption or output in excess of the socially efficient level. 
Before discussing these arguments, we should recall a principal 
exception. It was often raised in discussions of electric-power economics 
that assumed decreasing costs prevailed. An elaborate theory was 
developed to show that the consumer surplus enjoyed by users of the out- 
put of decreasing-cost industries could be used to finance the losses 
incurred with prices equal to marginal costs. 
The proposed expedient is a form of (second-order) price discrimina- 
tion called Rarnsey pricing. Consumers would face precisely the sort of 
declining-block-rate schedules electric utilities actually employ. An 
above-marginal-cos t price would be charged for the highly-valued initial 
levels of consumption and successively lower prices for each incremental 
block. 
The hope was that  the quantity available to the consumer at the 
price equal to the marginal cost of optimum production would equal the 
amount demanded a t  that price. The hgher prices for lower levels of 
consumption provided the financing needed. Ths argument is founded on 
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the proposition that beneficiaries should finance their gains. This still 
leaves open the question of optimal shares in the financing. 
Thls argument does not reverse well. Where output is already 
optimum, no incentive is needed to change it. Producers are certainly 
getting at  least enough to sustain production. Consumers similarly get 
some surplus as well as the optimal quantity supplied. Thus, neither pro- 
ducer nor consumer need to be coaxed into changing actions. The result- 
ing rents have no obvious use, and society must decide how best to 
employ them. 
This immediately leads to the propositions stated above about the 
views of economists on rent use. There is no reason in theory why the 
producers or consumers of a commodity with which economic rents are 
associated should be more deserving of possessing these rents than any 
other group. Historical experience suggests that rent allocation that 
favors participants in the rent-generating market can create many kinds 
of mischief. 
A primary problem is the confusion about the worthiness of aid of 
those involved in the market. Quite clearly, deserving people will trade in 
any widely used commodity that generates economic rents. However, it 
is hrghly improbable that the worthiness is accurately measured by indi- 
cators of the degree of participation in the market. Favoritism to sup- 
pliers or consumers is generally tied to the extent of engagement and 
thus implicitly assumes the existence of a high correlation between 
participation and merit. 
The minimum problem that can arise is the prevalence of unseemly 
and intractable battles over who should benefit. U.S.oi1 policies have 
perennially involved battles over shares of the benefits. When the states 
restricted output, fights raged about what types of producers should 
endure the largest share of the cuts. Many groups battled for access to 
the rents from possessing oil import quotas. Small refineries, refineries 
in Puerto Rico, and petrochemical manufacturers all were favored. 
Similarly, efforts to use price controls to limit economic rents in U.S. 
natural gas production have forced regulators into pettifogging efforts to 
rank consumption categories in their order of merit. 
Actually, the most basic subsidy in electric power is that given to all 
consumers through keeping prices a t  average costs. Effectively, the 
excesses of revenues over costs when an increasing cost industry equates 
marginal costs price have not been allowed to occur. These profits have 
been eliminated by keeping prices below marginal cost thus encouraging 
(and meeting) additional demand. Effectively, the profits are being used 
to subsidize the additional output (see Gordon, 1981). 
Predictably, this decision to spread around rents has opened a mass 
of controversy. Bitter battles are fought over how the subsidies should be 
shared. 
Presently, the great battle is over access to the economic rents from 
low-cost power. The most dramatic case is in the Pacific Northwest which 
has depleted its low-cost hydro resources. Withn the region, battles rage 
over who gets the rents. It dawned upon the U.S. Congress that the tradi- 
tion of favoring public or cooperative utilities could have perverse equity 
effects. The customers of such utilities were not necessarily more or less 
deserving than those of privately-owned utilities. Policy was, therefore, 
changed to favor the household customers of all utilities. 
In addition, areas outside the region continually seek access to an 
increased share in the rents. The leader in this effort predictably is Cali- 
fornia. A call for greater access to Pacific-Northwest power is a major 
element in the elaborate state strategy to avoid construction of new 
power plants in the state. 
Similar squabbling has occurred elsewhere. New Hampshire tried to 
limit sharing the benefits of low-cost hydroelectric power with the rest of 
New England. Massachusetts threatened to retaliate by limiting access to 
its low-cost nuclear power. Another battle prevails over how to interpret 
the vague requirement for sharing with other states that conditions the 
rights granted New York state to utilize hydroelectric resources in the 
Niagara Falls region 
Of course, worse problems have arisen elsewhere. The perverse 
income distribution effects of world oil price rises have probably been 
more harmful than any of my U.S. examples. The OPEC experience sug- 
gests that commodity price rigging is more likely to be a markedly infe- 
rior than a particularly good way to improve income distribution. The 
creation of instant millionaires of a lucky few is no more attractive in the 
Gulf of Persia than in the Gulf of Mexico. 
The final insult to economic sensibility is that politicians are so 
enthralled with producing new inequities that they eagerly impose ineffi- 
ciencies to attain their goals. There are supposedly realistic economists 
naive enough to believe that an equity-efficiency tradeoff is made. Adam 
Smith knew better. We should heed warnings that it is too often the 
powerful and undeserving who get aid. It is no wonder that the one thing 
on which James Tobin and Milton Friedman agree is that direct aid to the 
poor is better than intervention in individual markets. Thus, aid to the 
aluminum industry would be another inglorious episode in this saga of 
inappropriate action. 
Conclusions on Electricity for Alllminum 
The prior analysis has warned of the limits to finding low-cost loca- 
tions to produce aluminum. It also has been suggested that in the 
absence of such options the cost of electricity will be the cost of nuclear 
generation with proper adjustment to the way the industry alleviates or 
aggravates the peak load problem. It was also suggested that the rents 
generated by the existence of cost differences in electricity generation 
could be used to subsidize aluminum production but such subsidies were 
unwise. 
The analysis deliberately did not attempt to provide estimates of 
whether substantial opportunities existed to relocate the aluminum 
industry near cheap power. I only wanted to warn that the advocacy at 
relocation may have been overdone. 
If I am correct, the long-run equilibrium of the aluminum market will 
involve marginal suppliers dependent upon nuclear or possibly coal gen- 
erated electricity for the bulk of their power. As the electric power 
industry adapts to  the changing economics of generation, international 
differences in power costs should diminish. 
However, the adjustment will be slow and painful problems will be 
endured by aluminum producers. The oil prices shocks of the 1970s seem 
to have surprised everyone including the OPEC countries themselves, the 
governments of OECD countries, the major oil companies, the leading con- 
sumers, and academic energy specialists. Losses obviously were suffered 
by those most dependent upon oil. 
Those countries such as the United States, Canada, and Norway that 
avoided a heavy dependence on oil-generated electricity have a signifi- 
cant short-term advantage over countries such as Japan and France with 
extensive oil generation. The eventual evolution is unclear. Canada still 
has significant amounts of hydro resources in Quebec that can hold down 
cost rises. The United States never got as heavily involved with oil as did 
other countries. The substantial backlog of plans to add coal and nuclear 
powered capacity combined with resurgence of gas availability in some 
regions, notably California, has enabled the U.S. to cut oil generation 
almost 60 percent from 1978 to 1982. The 1982 level of oil generation was 
the lowest since 1969. However, the barriers to electric power expansion 
caused by an unfavorable regulatory climate may cause the U.S. position 
to erode in time 
The final concern is what this means for aluminum market pros- 
pects. This depends upon analyzing all the impacts of higher energy 
costs on materials supply and demand. Key considerations besides those 
cited here are changes in the supply economics of other materials and 
changes in the demand for materials. I can only offer conjectures such as 
that petrochemicals may suffer more than aluminum and other metals 
may suffer less on the production cost side. What the implications of the 
search for energy saving in consumption may be is less clear. More exten- 
sive study of the relevant markets than I have undertaken is needed to 
resolve these issues. 
Changes thus will certainly occur in the aluminum industry, but it 
would be foolhardy to predict their nature without careful study. The 
prior discussion may not have resolved all the issues, but it should have 
exposed some of the misconceptions that can arise about electric power. 
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